which can be rephrased explicitly by using the noun part as in (9) and (10): (9) The upper part of the Rhine is polluted. (10) The eastern part of Scotland gets a lot of sun.
But on semantic grounds it will be argued that a part-analysis also works best for examples like (5) -(7) or the following one where a qualifying phrase is used with a proper name:
(11) The Paris of the 20ies was exciting.
In such cases we are not attributing a property to a spatial part of an individual as in (4) or (8) - (10) but to a certain temporal part.
In the first sections of the paper two alternative analyses of the above examples will be discussed: first, the adverbial analysis arising from the philosophical literature, for instance from Lowe (88) , and second, Landman's (89) account which stems from his treatment of appositive as-phrases. Yet it will be argued that those analyses fall short on semantic grounds, i.e., they are neither compositional or uniform, nor are they able to explain the logical behaviour envinced by the above examples. As an alternative, in the following section the part-analysis will be worked out in detail. Under this analysis proper names denote sets of spatio-temporal parts of individuals as suggested by Quine (60) . This will give us a semantically satisfying analysis of the above modified proper names under which they pick out certain parts of those sets. In the final section some prima facie objections against the part-analysis will be dealt with. In particular it will be shown that this analysis can be embedded into recent algebraic approaches suggested by Link (83) or Oj eda (91) that provide a unified semantics of common nouns.
The Adverbial Analysis
The surface structure of sentences (4) - (8) or (11) suggests that modifiers like young or qualifiers like in the 20ies are constituents of the resulting NPs, thus they should somehow affect their semantic values. Yet with regard to similar examples it has been argued that they have an adverbial status in the sense of specifying when and where some relation or property holds of some individual objects; see for instance Lowe (88) and also Haslanger (88) for such views. The modifiers are assumed to play the same semantic role as the prepositional phrases in the following examples:
(12) The Rhine is polluted in France. Note that under this kind of approach we would with (4) -(6) attribute the same predicates or relations to the same individuals as we do in (1) -(3). By adding modifiers like young or upp er we are simply specifying more in detail when Mozart visited Paris or where the Rhine is polluted. Evidence for this adverbial analysis seems to derive from the fact that for instance (5) can be rephrased as follows: (14) W.A. Mozart visited Paris in his youth.
But despite this prima facie evidence I believe that the adverbial analysis fails on semantic grounds. First, it does not offer a compositional analysis nor a uniform one that fits in with other accounts of similar constructions. For example, one would expect that the determiner and the modifiers in (4) -(6) play the same role as they do in examples like the following ones:
(15) The young man is tall. (16) The upper flat is the most expensive one.
But the role of the determiner simply gets ignored under the adverbial analysis and the noun modifiers are supposed to play the role of prepositional phrases or give rise to them in some mysterious way. Secondly, and even more importantly, the adverbial analysis seems unable to account for certain examples in which modified proper names occur. Consider for instance the following sentences with such NPs in object position: With regard to such examples it seems implausible to say that the temporal modifiers or qualifiers specify the time when some property or relation holds of a certain individual. For instance in order for (17) and (18) to be true neither must Mary have liked Paris in the 20ies nor must John have found Bogart attractive in Bogart's youth. In fact the truth of (17) and (18) is compatible with the truth of the following sentences: To summarize, the account of modified proper names given by the adverbial analysis neither seems to be uniform nor compositional, and even more importantly it yields the wrong contents for examples like (17) and (18), i.e., it makes wrong predictions regarding the logical behaviour of certain examples. 1
Restricted NPs and Intensional Individuals
In his paper "Groups II", Landman deals with intensional plural expressions like committee. He proposes to treat them analogously to the NPs in the following sentences which consist of a proper name and a qualifying as-phrase:
(21) John as a judge is trustworthy.
(22) John as the president of the football club is corrupt.
Note that although John as a judge can be trustworthy he might not be so as the president of the football club, i.e., the truth of (21) is compatible with that of (22). Or to put it differently: substitution of the NPs in (2 1) and (22) for each other is not truth preserving, thus their semantic contribution seems to be different and in particular different from the one of the bare proper name John. It is obvious that examples (21) and (22) strongly resemble the ones we discussed in previous sections. For adding as-phrases to proper names and turning them into complex NPs has the same semantic effect as it had in the above examples where we added other kinds of modifiers or qualifiers.
Landman proposes to treat examples (21) and (22) as intensional contexts in which we do not attribute a property to an individual as such, but only under a certain aspect, i.e., to an intensional individual as he calls it. Then sentences (21) and (22) can both be true because the NPs in them denote different intensional individuals. What gives rise to the intensionality of these examples are the appositive as-phrases which are assumed to restrict the denotation of the NPs in a particular way. According to Landman such restrictions can also be made implicitly as for instance in the following examples: Sentences (23) and (25) constitute intensional contexts since it is possible that (23) and (24) can both be true while (25) is false. The only difference to the above example is that the NPs in (23) and (25) involve some hidden restrictions that give rise to this intensionality which for instance with regard to (23) can be made explicit as follows:
(26) The judge as a judge is on strike.
Landman formalizes intensional individuals as set of properties. For an extensional individual like John the usual correspondence between the individual itself and the set of all its properties holds, i.e., predicating something of John can be restated in terms of predicating something of the following set of properties:
(27) {PI P(john) }.
However for restricted NPs like John as a judge which are assumed to give rise to intensional contexts we do not have such a correspondence. They are assumed to denote sets of properties which are different from ones like (27). Landman defines some plausible closure conditions on such sets which turn restricted NPs into ultra filters of properties. This leads to an intensional treatment of properties in the model of the language since in any extensional framework the set of properties denoted by a restricted term like John as a judge would equal (27) NPs in the sense of denoting certain sets of properties. Clearly, given such kinds of denotations we would get enough "finegrainedness" to account for the logical behaviour of the constructions in which they occur. But the problem is that those examples do not seem to constitute intensional contexts. For instance it seems impossible that (4) and (29) Whenever (4) and (29) are true (30) must be false. The same case can be made with regard to temporally modified proper names. For instance (7) and (3 1) cannot both be true: Thus, in summary, a Landman-style analysis of the modified proper names in (4) -(8) or (11) seems implausible on semantic grounds. Not only is it unclear which intensions such NPs would denote, but more importantly, those sentences do not seem to constitute intensional contexts; they fail standard intensionality tests. In the following I will show how the part-analysis can give an extensional analysis of these NPs that treats them on a par with structurall y identical constructions.
The Part-Analysis
The part-analysis claims that sentences like (4) -(8) in which modified proper names occur can be best accounted for by assuming (i) that we are not making any statements about individual objects but about some of their parts and (ii) that the modified proper names denote those parts. This would gives us contents of the following kind for (4) - (6) (4) - (6) can be explained easily. For instance (5) and (35a) can both be true and not lead to any contradiction since we would make statements about different parts of Mozart as envinced by (35b) Further support for the analysis stems from the fact that parts of individuals can be denoted directly by NPs like The upper part of the Rhine, as noted already above. Yet, as it stands, the case for the part-analysis does not seem that strong. First, with regard to temporally modified NPs like The young W.A. Mozart, paraphrases involving the notion part explicitly are hard to come by. Secondly, as we have seen in the previous section, the logical behavior of (5) and (35a) can also be explained under a Landman-style analysis. Thus further arguments are needed for the part-analysis. One has to account for the notion of a part of an individual in order to illuminate the claim that The young WA. Mozart can denote such an entity. It would also be desirable if a compositional and uniform account for such modified proper names could be given that treats them semantically in the same way as structurally similar NPs like The young man or The upper flat in (15) and (16).
Starting with the latter question the first thing to note is that the NPs in (4) -(6) and in (15) and (16) all have the following structure:
where Noun is a common or a proper noun, Mod or Qual a modifier or a qualifier and N' and NP stand for the different types of categories. It is generally assumed that common nouns denote some sets of entities and modifiers or qualifiers denote functions that map those sets onto others set of entities of the same type, i.e., for an N'-constituent we get the following denotation:
In most cases modifiers or qualifiers will be affi rmative, Le., the following holds: In (39a) a definite description asserts the existence of a unique element in the set denoted by the N'-constituent whereas in (39b) it asserts the existence of a greatest or maximal element in this set that is according to Sharvy partially ordered by some part relation �; a e [N'll is the maximal element in [N'll if for all x e [N'll x � a. The main advantage of Sharvy's analysis is that it allows for a unified treatment of the different kinds of common nouns, i.e., for singular and plural count nouns as well as for mass nouns. This is the reason why it will be adopted it in the following.3 But instead of treating definite description of the form (36a, b) as incomplete symbols we will treat them as referring expressions with the following Sharvy-style semantics: This leads us to the question whether we can motivate a conception of individuals under which they consist of parts and are not atomic entities as is usually assumed. The notion of an individual I want to appeal to here is that of a spa tio-temporal region or "sausage" as outlined by Goodman (5 1) and Quine (60) and used for semantic purposes by Carlson (77) and Hinrichs (85) . Regarding such entities it makes sense to say that they have parts, namely sp atio-temporal parts, which can be seen as different slices of such sausages, as time slices or spatial slices. For instance W.A. Mozart's arm will be a particular spatial slice of the sausage W.A. Mozart whereas the young Mozart will be a certain temporal slice. Such parts can have other spatio-temporal parts as parts. For instance Southern Germany which is part of Germany has MUnchen and Stuttgart as parts, or the young W.A. Mozart which is part of W.A. Mozart may have the child Mozart and the teenager Mozart as parts. Also parts of an individual can be merged or fu sed together such that the resulting entity will again be a part of that individual. For instance different time slices of Paris, let us say its night slices, can be merged and the resulting part will again be a part of Paris. Finally ordinary properties and relations like Polluted or Funny as envinced by (32) and (34) can hold of such spatio-temporal parts, for instance Polluted of the upper Rhine or Funny of the joking Woody Allen. In fact the usual notion of a property P holding of an individual i at a time t, i.e. P(i, t), can be reduced to the following: there is a part p of i such that p's temporal extension is t and P holds of p, i.e. P(p). This conception of individuals as complex objects can be made more precise as follows: 4 (42) a. D is a non-empty set, namely our semantic domain, and ID a non-empty subset of D, namely the set of all individuals i, i', i", ... in D; b. D is partially ordered by a spatio-temporal part relation :S; st. such that :S; st is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetrical; c. For each i E ID, there is a set Pi : = {xl x :S; st i} of i's parts which contains more elements than just i and forms a complete join semilattice under :S; st. i.e., it is partially ordered by :S; st and each non-empty subset P' of Pi has a supremum in Pi.
On the basis of this conception of individuals it makes sense to say that a proper name denotes a set of parts. For as Quine (60) suggested, it simply denotes the set Pi of spatio-temporal parts of an individual i, where the individual itself is the maximal element in such a set. Thus a proper name like Mozart functions more like a noun or general term in the sense of denoting all those entities that make up Mozart or that are "Mozartizers ". Let us assume with Sharvy(80) that for each noun there is a part-relation :s; given on its extension which provides a partial order on that set. For proper names this part relation is the spatio-temporal part relation :S; st as described above which partially orders the union of all extensions of proper names; for mass nouns there might be different part relations. Further assume that all noun-modifiers and -qualifiers are affirmative, thus the denotations of N' constituents will also be partially ordered by the part relations of their head nouns. Then a model for our language can be defined as the structure <D, ID, IT n, f::;> where: for proper nouns this partial order will be given by :S;s t .
The first thing to note is that the model provides the right denotations for modified proper names in examples like (4) - (8) or (11) assuming we add (37) and (40) This denotation will be different from the one we get for The old W. A. Mozart since the adjectives will pick out different parts of the individual Mozart, young only young parts and old only old parts. For the NP The upper Rhine the analysis yields that part of the Rhine which is its maximal upper part and for The joking Woody Allen that part of Woody Allen which is his maximal joking part; the latter will be the fu sion of all those temporal slices or stages of Woody Allen that are joking since the fusion is the maximum of all those joking Woody Allen parts.
Further note that the part-analysis not only provides the right denotations for modified proper names but also treats them analogously to similar NPs with common nouns in head position. For instance for the NP The young cheese we get the same kind of denotation, although the part relation might be a different one here: In summary, the part-analysis yields the right kind of denotations for the modified proper names in (4) - (8) and (11) while not treating them in any way differently from other kinds of definite NPs. In particular it yields a compositional account, thus it succeeds on semantic grounds. 5 In the following section some prima facie objections to the part-analysis will be discussed.
Some Prima Facie Objections
As it stands a Sharvy-style analysis of definite NPs does not apply to NPs like Eastern Scotland or Mozart where the definite article is missing; such NPs for instance occur in sentences (2) and (8). Following Burge (73) and Bach (87) I suggest that we should analyse them semantically by positing a null-determiner. In particular, assuming that the null-determiner is a definite article, the Sharvy-style analysis under (40) With regard to such constructions that have no definite article, one also wants to specify the denotations by a Sharvy-style analysis of definite NPs. Thus there is nothing ad hoc if we do the same regarding the structurally similar NPs in (2) and (8). In some contexts proper names just seem to function syntactically more like mass nouns, in others more like count nouns. 6
The final point I want to make relates to the recent algebraic approaches to providing a unified semantics of common nouns as suggested by Link (83) and worked out further by Oj eda (9 1). For one might think that the above analysis of proper names blurs an explanatorily important classification of the different kinds of common nouns as put forward by those authors. This classification is based on the assumptions that the semantic domain D in (43) forms a complete join semilattice under a part relation $; in the following we will write +D' for sup:s;D' and call + the join over the elements in D', with D;2 D'. 7 Then one can define the notion of a minimal element and some other related notions relative to D as follows:
(49) a. An element ae A, D ;2 A, is a minimal element or atom in A iff for all be A if b $ a then a = b; b. An element ae A, D ;2 A, is a molecule if it is the join of some nonempty set of atoms of A, i.e. a=+A' with A' is a set of atoms; c. An element ae A, D;2 A, that is neither a molecule or an atom is a nonmolecule.
Oj eda (89) proposes that singular and plural count nouns as well as mass nouns can be classified by the different kinds of entities they denote. All will denote some subset of our semantic universe D but the subsets will differ as follows: (50) ( 5 1 The set ID is the set of individual objects as outlined above relative to which a similar classification of nouns can be made as under (50). If we take ID as our set of atoms then singular count nouns denote relative to ID sets of atoms, plural count nouns sets of molecules that have those atoms as parts and mass nouns sets of entities of which some are neither atoms nor molecules relative to ID. In addition we have the extra condition that proper nouns denote subsets of D, namely sets of parts of individuals as stated under (42) and (43). Thus the above treatment of proper names does not blur the classification in (50) but rather enriches it in the sense that we get a general account of nouns.
Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed a part-analysis for sentences like (4) -(8) and (11) in which modified proper names occur. According to this analysis we are attributing herein properties or relations to particular spatio-temporal parts of individuals that are denoted by the modified proper names like The young Mozart or The upper Rhine. Central to the part-analysis is a conception of individuals as complex objects consisting of spatio-temporal parts. This allows for a Quinean treatment of proper names under which they denote sets of parts of an individual. Then the function of the modifiers becomes to pick out a subset of such a set and combined with a Sharvy-style analysis of definite descriptions we get as denotations the maximal element in such a set. From a semantic perspective the proposed analysis seem preferable to others since it not only enables us to explain the logical behavior of sentences in which modified proper names occur but also does so in a compositional and uniform way which treats The young Mozart on a par with structurally similar NPs like The young man or The young cheese. What emerges is a unified semantic analysis of common and proper nouns according to which they just denote different kinds of subsets of our semantic universe D.
Endnotes * I want to thank Elisabet Engdahl, Jonathan Ginzburg and Robin Cooper; the first for encouraging my interest in the topic of the paper and the latter two for many helpful comments on different versions of it. The paper has also profited from the participants of SALT4 and of several workshops and discussion groups in Edinburgh, notably from comments by Ivan Derzhanski, Alice Drewery, Sheila Glasbey, Massimo Poesio, Lucia Tovena and Peter Ruhrberg. 1. Note that even if semantic considerations played no role in judging the adequacy of the adverbial analysis it is highly questionable if it can achieve its own underlying aim which seems to be the avoidance of parts of individual objects in the semantics of sentences like (4) - (8) Thus we have at least to allow for spatial parts in our semantics. But even with temporal modifiers as in (5) (14)? We do not seem to refer to any external time instant or interval as we do in (13) with in 1762 . Thus here a case could be made for temporal parts of individuals. But if we have to assume parts anyway in our ontology one might wonder why not to allow the modified proper names to denote them directly as suggested under the part analysis. 2. The sets of entities denoted by nouns need not necessarily be subsets of our semantic domain D but might be subsets of the power set of D. This seems plausible for instance with regard to plural count nouns like dogs or cats; see Landman (89) for such an account of common nouns. But in order to simplify our presentation I will assume in the following that the sets denoted by the different kinds of common nouns are always subsets of D; see Link (83) or Oj eda (91) for accounts that make this assumption. 3. For mass nouns and plural count nouns Russell's analysis seems inadequate since the N'-constituents here do not have to denote singleton sets. For instance the N'-constituent in The Gold in ZUrich will denote a set that contains more than one piece of gold since there will be many of them in Zurich. The function of the definite article here is not to indicate uniqueness but totality, i.e., to pick out the maximal element that is gold in Zurich (see Sharvy (80) and Oj eda (9 1) for more discussion of this issue). In recent years a Sharvy-style analysis of definite descriptions has been adopted in some algebraic approaches to the semantics of common nouns; see for instance Oj eda (91). 4. Carlson (77) makes use of the notion of a spatio-temporal part in order to account for the two readings one gets for bare plurals, i.e. the existential and the universal reading. For instance a bare plural like rain drops gives rise to the existential reading in Rain drops fe ll on the city and to the universal reading in Rain drops are wet. In the first case we are supposed to existentially quantify over spatio-temporal parts of individuals, or stages as he calls them, whereas in the second case we predicate something of complex individual objects. What gives rise to those readings are, according to Carlson, the different kinds of predicates that combine with a bare plural, either a stage-level predicate or an individual-level predicate. It should be noted that the part-readings we get for the NPs in sentences like (4) -(8) do not depend in any way on the involved predicates and this is one of the reasons why a Carlson-style explanation in tenns of stage-level predicates is not available to us here. 5. The part-analysis might offer an alternative account of the Landman examples such as John as a judge. For instead of treating sentences in which such NPs occur as intensional contexts, which seems disputable anyway, one could give an extensional treatment under which the NPs just pick out certain parts of the sets denoted by the proper names. For instance John as a judge would denote the maximal temporal judge-acting part of John. Clearly, such a part would be different from his maximal football-club-president-acting part which would be denoted by John as the president of the fo otball club. 6. Burge and others noted that proper names sometimes seem to fu nction more like count nouns as suggested by the following examples The Alfred who plays the flute joined the band today or I know fe w Alfreds in Edinburgh. In the light of this evidence Burge proposed to treat proper names as denoting sets of individuals and not denoting particular individuals. One should note that on the basis of some minor modifications this proposal can be fitted in very easily to the above treatment of proper names. The most reasonable option here is to relativize the interpretation function [ ] to a context factor c, i.e., we get [ .11 . Then relative to some c a proper name could denote a set of individuals but relative to another c' a set of parts of an individual. This would give us the right denotations for the resulting NPs in which those proper names occur as constituents. 7. Note that if one takes into account how is part of gets used in natural language it seems more plausible that there are different part relations as suggested under (43). But one can make sense of a unique part relation by conceiving of it more along the lines of a spatio-temporal or material part relation as suggested by Goodman (51) or Quine(60) .
